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REGULATORY ADJUDICATONH
By Marcia L. McCormick*
Calls for increased regulation are flying fast and furious these days. We use regulation in
the United States to prevent harm that various kinds of activities might cause and also to create
positive external benefits that those activities could yield, but might not without incentives. Most
regulatory programs in the United States provide a blend of measures designed to create these
positive external benefits, promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and provide
those harmed with remedies. At a time in which we contemplate new ways to regulate to deal
with the crises of the day and prevent the crises of tomorrow, this article seeks to explore one
piece of the regulatory solution: adjudication. Adjudication is used both to deter harmful
behavior and to remedy harmful behavior engaged in. And it is used in a variety of contexts.
To explore how we might construct agencies with greater adjudicatory power, I will use
the regulation of equal employment opportunity as a case study. This article explains the
weaknesses of the current system to enforce the antidiscrimination laws and outlines a proposal
for what an adjudicative agency designed to maximize the benefits from an agency perspective
would look like. The paper goes on to analyze the limits article III may place on the structure of
adjudicating agencies and ways those limits might be overcome.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Calls for increased regulation are flying fast and furious these days. They are spurred by
crises over the last couple of years in a relatively broad range of areas from the financial crisis, to
tainted food, to defective consumer products, to consumer and worker exploitation, along with
the looming new challenges like averting the worst consequences of global climate change,
controlling the rise in healthcare costs, or protecting worker retirement plans as the workforce
grows lopsidedly older.1 Regulatory reform even has significant pop culture caché. The comedy
website Funny or Die and actors from Saturday Night Live who had all played presidents during
those presidents‘ administrations recently produced a video for The Main Street Brigade, a
political consumer protection organization, in which former presidents urge President Obama to
push for the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. 2 New agencies are rarely the stuff of sketch
comedy. Meanwhile, in the background, scholars continue to study ways to regulate better,
minimizing any inappropriate interference with the market and with individual liberty, while
promoting good policy and averting the disasters a lack of regulation can cause.
We use regulation in the United States to prevent harm that various kinds of activities
might cause and also to create positive external benefits that those activities could yield, but
might not without incentives. For example, we regulate the production of goods to prevent harm
to the environment caused by the processes of production, to prevent harm to the consumers of
those goods that use might cause, and to protect the health and safety of the workers who produce
1

See for example, the widespread outbreak of E-Coli from tainted peanuts, which led to a call for increased
regulation of food safety. Betty Ann Bowser, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Butter Raises
Wider Health Concerns for FDA (PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2009), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june09/salmonella_01-23.html, and the hearings on safety problems with
Toyota cars, Micheline Maynard, In Senate, Toyota Officials again Facing Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010
(reporting that at least one senator criticized the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration for having
failed to act). Similarly, some have suggested that lack of regulation, or at least a lack of action by regulators, was
responsible for the crash of the mortgage market and subsequent financial crisis from late 2007 to the present. See
Catherine Rampbell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A1; Richard A.
Posner, Op-Ed, Our Crisis of Regulation, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2009, at A23 (suggesting that regulators of the
markets and banking industries ―were asleep at the switch‖); Nelson D. Schwartz & Floyd Norris, Reluctant Eye over
Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2008, at A1 (reporting on responses to allegations of regulatory failure).
And the current presidential administration has proposed both regulatory changes in existing agencies, and
also entirely new agencies. E.g. David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote Backs a Financial Oversight Body, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at B3 (describing a bill to create a new consumer financial protection agency as well as
changes to existing law to strengthen regulation of banks and trade in derivatives); Commerce Department Proposes
Establishment of NOAA Climate Service (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100208_climate.html; Press Release No. 10-0251-NAT, U.S. Labor
Department rules to improve retirement security announced as part of White House Middle Class Task Force‘s yearend report, (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA20100251.htm (describing proposals to
increase regulation of employee retirement plans); Statement by the President on House Passage of the Health
Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statementpresident-house-passage-health-insurance-industry-fair-competition-act (concerning legislation to regulate the
business of health insurance) .
2
http://www.funnyordie.com/videos/f5a57185bd/funny-or-die-s-presidential-reunion.
2
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those goods. We also regulate the production of goods to promote distribution of the benefits that
flow from their production and to distribute benefits the government might have to supply
instead. So we regulate the number of hours a person can work and set a minimum level of pay.
We also regulate the ways in which companies that produce goods interact with their employees
in a way that allows the employees to band together to better their working conditions and pay
and to bring in more workers to receive the same benefits. Finally, we provide incentives for
those companies to compensate employees in ways that promote their health (by providing health
insurance), guard against wage loss that might come with an inability to work (by providing
disability insurance), and save for retirement.
Most regulatory programs in the United States provide a blend of measures designed to
create these positive external benefits, promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and
provide those harmed with remedies. At a time in which we contemplate new ways to regulate to
deal with the crises of the day and prevent the crises of tomorrow, this article seeks to explore
one piece of the regulatory solution: adjudication. Adjudication is used both to deter harmful
behavior and to remedy harmful behavior engaged in. And it is used in a variety of contexts.
The traditional method of adjudication, using courts and the formal trial process, is rather
expensive, which is one of the reasons that adjudication works as a deterrent. But that expense
means that using this aspect of regulation will be less attractive. Still, it need not be. Much of our
federal regulation is done by administrative agencies, created to develop expertise in the area
being regulated, to regulate more effectively, and to regulate in a more cost-effective manner.
Agencies could perform the adjudicatory function of regulation.
Several agencies do perform adjudicatory functions, but adjudication by agencies has not
been adopted wholesale for every area of regulation because of separation of powers concerns.
The Constitution in Article III places the judicial power of the United States in the judicial
branch and requires that those who exercise the judicial power be given life tenure and salary
protection.3 Thus, while Congress has the power to create agencies to enforce the laws,4 it may
not have power to vest those agencies with the judicial power of the United States unless the
adjudicators have life tenure and salary protection.5 So to the extent that regulation through
adjudication would require an exercise of the judicial power of the United States, we may need to
tread carefully.
To explore how we might construct agencies with greater adjudicatory power, I will use
the regulation of equal employment opportunity as a case study. As a preliminary matter, I
recognize that we don‘t usually talk about equal employment opportunity as something to be
regulated. Instead we use the language of rights. But this is an area in which we have used law
instrumentally to change broader social norms, and so regulation seems an apt description of the
3

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 9.
5
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 223 (5th ed. 2007); see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (finding the bankruptcy court unconstitutional because judges without life tenure had
jurisdiction over inherently judicial matters without adequate supervision of Article III judges).
3
4
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process that we are using to prevent the harm of discrimination and to remedy the harm
discrimination causes. Employment discrimination laws in the United States have not created full
equality in the workplace, and in fact progress on that front is viewed by many as having stalled,
which makes it ripe for regulatory reform. The federal government, particularly the legislative
and executive branches, needs to take a more active role to vindicate the public interest, create
accountability, and help promote equality in the private sector. Agency adjudication could be one
tool to accomplish these goals, and could also be used in other areas to accomplish similar goals.
Thus, analyzing in this area will tell us important things about the application in other contexts as
well.
I will begin the exploration of the problem of agency adjudication by explaining a bit
more fully the weaknesses of the current system to enforce the antidiscrimination laws and then
outlining my proposal for what an adjudicative agency designed to maximize the benefits from
an agency perspective would look like. Part III will then lay out the limits article III may place on
the structure of adjudicating agencies. Finally, Part IV discusses ways that the agency could be
designed to minimize the constitutional objections while maximizing the benefits that agency
adjudication is harnessed for.
II. THE CASE FOR A NEW AGENCY STRUCTURE
As I explained more fully in a prior article,6 two somewhat interrelated reasons that the
employment discrimination laws are not as effective as they could be are what I have called the
enforcement gap and the secrecy problem, both of which are caused by an overreliance on
adjudication without support from other regulatory tools. This part will explain what those
problems are and how reliance on private adjudication causes them.
I will start with the enforcement gap, which simply refers to the fact that our laws
prohibiting discrimination are not being fully enforced. The existence of this gap is demonstrated
by the failure of Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes7 to substantially
6

Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193 (2009).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, religion, and sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (2006). Several other statutes also prohibit
discrimination. One such statute prohibits discrimination in contracts, including at-will employment, on the basis of
race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215-19, 255-56, 259-60, 262 (2006)) prohibits discrimination in compensation on
the basis of sex. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)) prohibits discrimination on the basis of age. Similarly Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-117, 12204-13 (2006)) prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.
Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 705, 791, 794a (2006)) also prohibit discrimination, including in employment, against those with disabilities, but
only for recipients of federal funds. Likewise, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat,
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d through 2000d-7 (2006)) prohibits discrimination, including in employment, on
the basis of race by recipients of federal funds, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006)) prohibits discrimination, including in
employment, on the basis of gender by recipients of federal funds. Finally, the Family Medical Leave Act, Pub. L.
NO. 103-2, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 29 U.S. C. §§ 2601, 2611-19 (2006)) requires that family and
4
7
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eliminate employment discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, the main tool
designed to create equality at work has been in effect for more than forty years – more than two
generations. And while Title VII and laws patterned on it protecting additional groups have
helped to make a difference for many, the U.S. is not yet in a position to say that it has achieved
equality. In fact, scholars are becoming ever more vocal about the lack of racial and gender
equality in the work force under almost any measure: employment rates, wages, job integration,
and labor force participation.8 And while some people have argued that Title VII has eliminated
most overt discrimination,9 others have contradicted that, pointing for example to large class
actions brought against big companies for expressly racist and sexist behavior.10 Michael Selmi,
for example, has gone so far as to label the form of discrimination alleged in these current cases
―seventies-style‖ discrimination.11 In two generations, we should have gotten past the seventies.
The system is not working as well as it should.
The system does not work as well as it should because the antidiscrimination norm is
unsettled, and the method of enforcing our ban on employment discrimination is not suited to
work social change. For the system to work, we need greater public information and greater
opportunities to work towards consensus. To accomplish that goal, I have proposed that we
create a federal agency designed to make public employee and applicant allegations of
discrimination, investigations of charges of discrimination, and adjudication of such claims.
Additionally, because of the national public interest in removing discrimination entirely from the
workplace, a federal agency with greater regulatory power must also have the power to impose
sanctions on offending employers.
Although there are federal agencies with some power to enforce our laws that prohibit
employment discrimination,12 the primary enforcement mechanism is the ex ante mechanism of a
medical leave be provided to employees regardless of gender.
8
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 &
nn.3, 5-6 (2006); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a
Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights
Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 353 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST.
JOHN‘S L. REV. 899, 900 (2005).
9
E.g. Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 146 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that ―in most instances Title VII
has eliminated the more obvious and explicit forms of discrimination‖); John J. Donohue & James J. Heckman, Reevaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L. J. 1713-14, 1713, 1729 (1991); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of
Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 480 (1995).
10
E.g. Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367 (2008);
Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 1 (2005).
11
Selmi, supra note 10.
12
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has some power to enforce our employment
discrimination laws. The EEOC adjudicates claims against federal employers, and for private sector charges, it can
investigate, seek conciliation, or bring an action in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 6, 8, 16 (2006). Employers
with more than 100 employees are required to submit demographic data to the EEOC, as well, and that could lead to
investigations or an action in federal court. Id. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. part 1602 (2009). The Department of Labor‘s
Office of Contract Compliance Programs can require employers not to discriminate as a condition of accepting a
contract with the federal government. As part of that power, it can enforce those contractual provisions by
conducting compliance evaluations and complaint investigations, obtaining conciliation agreements, monitoring
contractors progress through periodic compliance reports, recommending enforcement actions to the Solicitor of
5
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private right of action for injunctive relief or damages against an employer,13 and this is what has
led to the enforcement gap. Private litigation is a poor enforcement tool for a number of reasons.
Many employees do not know their rights or do not realize they have been discriminated
against.14 Many who know their rights do not pursue them; they might still be working for the
employer and may fear retaliation.15 They may also fear that they would be labeled a
troublemaker by other employers and become essentially unemployable.16 Furthermore, even
where employees pursue their rights, they are rarely successful in federal court.17 And even when
employees are successful, the remedies imposed rarely create the kinds of structural changes that
will help prevent discrimination by the employer or other employers in the future.18
Reliance on private litigation also leads to suppression of information about allegations of
discrimination. I have labeled this the secrecy problem. The secrecy problem is caused in large
part by channeling disputes into tracks alternative to the public trial. Alternative dispute
resolution is not a public process, and resolutions are often kept confidential or at least not made
public.19 The secrecy problem is related to the reliance on litigation to enforce the employment
discrimination laws. Because of the expense of traditional litigation, many employers look to

Labor, and debarring a company's federal contracts plus obtaining backpay and other relief for employees. U.S.
COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT‘S 2006 REQUEST, at ch.
3 (2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund06/crfund06.pdf.
13
See McCormick, supra note 6, at 205-06, 208 (contrasting the number of charges brought to the EEOC and the
number of private actions brought in federal court with the number of actions filed by the EEOC).
14
Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and Reporting
Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 804-06 (2006) (reporting that many people do not accurately perceive
when they have been discriminated against).
15
Sally Riggs Fuller, Lauren B. Edelman, & Sharon F. Matusik, Legal Readings: Employee Interpretation and
Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200, 208 (2000) (summarizing literature).
16
Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payments to Named Plaintiffs in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 395, 397, 410-11 (2006); see also
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 26-30 (1992) (reporting on
a 1980 study by the Civil Litigation Research Project).
17
For example, few cases go to trial. E.g. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile
Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 n.330 (1999) (suggesting that only ten percent of
employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440-41, 444 (2004) (suggesting
that seventy percent of employment discrimination cases settle and plaintiffs win only just over four percent of
pretrial adjudications). When they do go to trial, few cases are resolved in favor of employees. Kevin M. Clermont et
al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J.
547, 556-58, 566 (2003) (finding that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are four times more likely to be reversed
than those found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283-84, 309 (1997) (arguing that meritorious cases are lost or reversed
on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558,
560-61 (2001) (asserting that employers prevail in ninety eight percent of federal court employment discrimination
cases resolved at the pretrial stage).
18
Levit, supra note 10; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003) (documenting how class actions fail to affect shareholder
price or real management change in most cases).
19
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1987); Laura
Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575 (1986).
6
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alternative methods to resolve disputes.20 One of these methods has been mandatory, binding
arbitration, in which the parties agree before any dispute has arisen to waive any right to go to
court and instead to use an arbitral forum. In the mid-nineties, the Supreme Court endorsed predispute arbitration agreements to resolve discrimination claims,21 and many employers have
required employees to agree as a condition of employment to arbitrate any future disputes.22
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for these statutory rights has been attacked, primarily on
fairness grounds: that employees really have no choice but to agree, that employers can write the
agreements to benefit themselves, and that arbitrators may be more likely to rule in favor of
repeat player employers.23 Such agreements have been defended with arguments that arbitration
is simply a change in forum, not in the substantive law to be applied, that the process is quicker
and less expensive for employees as well, and that employees are more likely to win in

20

See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668
(1986).
21
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). The Court recently confirmed that individual
employees not only could be required to arbitrate their statutory disputes as a condition of employment, but also that
a union could waive individual employees‘ rights to bring a statutory claim in court and agree to arbitration instead.
14 Penn. Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
22
Several studies have been conducted to try to gauge how many businesses have adopted mandatory arbitration.
Those surveys reflected that by the late 1990s and early 2000s, approximately fifteen percent of companies had
adopted mandatory arbitration. Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration
and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 581, 586-88 (2004)
(reporting on several surveys) [hereinafter Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration]; see also KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 189 (2004) (noting that as of
2004, the number of employees covered by mandatory arbitration agreements equaled the number covered by
collective bargaining agreements). A mid-1990s United States General Accounting Office survey suggested almost
all firms with 100 or more employees used some method of ADR. U.S. GAO, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1995), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:he95150.pdf (reporting that while only
about ten percent of these employers used arbitration, almost ninety percent used some form of ADR). About sixtyfour percent of the workforce is employed by employers this size or larger. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPANY
STATISTICS: PROFILING U.S. BUSINESSES, TABULATIONS BY ENTERPRISE SIZE (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb05.htm (select ―U.S. and all States, totals‖ link to download the figures from
which this number is calculated). And the larger the company, the more likely it is to have used arbitration. Michael
H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. &
POL‘Y REV. 573, 578 n.22 (2005) (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as
Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 93, at A4 (May 14, 1997)). The use of
arbitration has increased since the late 1990s. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation
of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISPUTE RES. J. 44 (Jan. 2004). In his most recent article,
Alexander Colvin suggests that nearly one quarter of the workforce is covered by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 405, 411 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Empirical Research].
23
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 682-83, 685-86 (1996). Reginald Alleyne, Statutory
Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381,
403, 426 (1996); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 936 (1979);
Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
635, 656; Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost–How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994).
7
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arbitration than in court.24 The debate will keep empiricists busy for years.
It is not necessary to resolve this debate, though, to call for the solution this paper calls
for. In other words, potential unfairness to individual litigants is not the only problem, and it is
not the problem that this paper is primarily concerned with. The much bigger problem is that
arbitration, or any other alternative form of dispute resolution the way it is currently structured,
for that matter, creates a complete lack of public accountability. The law need not be followed in
resolving the dispute, and the resolution is usually kept secret, or at least not made public.25 If the
public cannot find out that there has been a dispute involving discrimination, what was alleged to
have occurred, and what the resolution was, the public can neither ensure that the employment
discrimination norm is being enforced, nor can it tell the nature of the norms that are developing
– in fact, norms don‘t develop.
Neither the enforcement gap nor the secrecy problem would be especially problematic if
the disputes we were talking about were really simply disputes between two private parties. If the
injured sleep on their rights, they usually hurt only themselves. And if the injured are satisfied
with a relatively quick, easy, and less expensive system of dispute resolution that needs little in
the way of public resources, everyone is better off.
Employment discrimination is not solely a private dispute, however. The harm of
employment discrimination reaches beyond the individual employee to the group that employee
is a member of and to the public at large. Discrimination in the aggregate can create a permanent
underclass, or keep one segment of the population dependent on another. Moreover, as the recent
housing market crash followed by massive layoffs and government stimulus plans along with the
push for health care reform have demonstrated, our economy and social welfare system literally
depend on effective functioning of the system of employment. Work is the vehicle through which
we distribute money and social goods. Thus, because acts of discrimination harm the public and
the public has so much at stake in labor relations in the aggregate, the public has an interest to be
24

Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991); see Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632-34 (2005) (describing both the level of criticism of mandatory
arbitration agreements and their expansive use). Some empirical research supports the assertion that arbitration is a
boon for employers at the expense of employees, Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 22, at 414-19, 423-24,
while other empirical research suggests that employees win slightly more often in arbitration than they do in
litigation, but are awarded less in damages, Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for
Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145 (2004); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion
Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT‘L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995);
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (NYU
Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 65, 2003; Cornell Law School Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=389780 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.389780; Michael H. LeRoy, supra note 22, at 576-77, 589
(asserting that employees tend to win in arbitration but the value of the award is much less than what the courts
offer); Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (2003); Lewis L.
Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in HOW ADR WORKS
915, 921 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).
25
Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754, 789-93 (1984) (arguing that this frees the parties to reach more creative solutions); Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1987); Laura Macklin,
Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575 (1986).
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vindicated in the enforcement scheme. In that sense, the regulation of the employment
relationship is much more like regulation of the securities markets,26 the environment, workplace
safety, or food and drug safety than it is regulation of individual contractual relationships, or
discrete individual harms.
The employment relationship is not regulated like the environment, the securities market,
workplace safety, or food and drug safety, however. Those systems of regulation include some ex
ante barriers to entry, extensive reporting requirements, the power to spread the information
collected, the power to inspect, and some coercive power, including the ability to fine regulated
parties.27 Instead, our enforcement system for employment discrimination law relies primarily on
allowing individual employees a private right of action to sue employers for discrimination in
courts. There is very little federal oversight except incidentally through the courts when the
parties choose to air the issues there – the courts themselves do not vindicate the public interest,
although they do make public important information about the dispute.
We might expect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency created to
enforce Title VII and given responsibility for subsequent antidiscrimination laws as well, to serve
that role, but it does not. For private sector employment discrimination claims, the EEOC has the
power to investigate, but it depends primarily on private individuals bringing charges to it, rather
than on initiating its own investigations. Additionally, the agency‘s investigation is rather thin.
Although an employer must respond to a charge of discrimination, and the EEOC can subpoena
records, the agency does not inspect workplaces, monitor employer behavior, or impose sanctions
on uncooperative or discriminating employers. Even more importantly, the EEOC cannot make
public information contained in the charges it receives, nor can it reveal much information it
gathers from employers who have to file compliance reports with it.28
The EEOC also has little impact on determining when an employee has a valid
discrimination claim. It acts as something of a gatekeeper to the courts, but it is a very weak one.
An employee has to file a charge with the EEOC before the employee can bring a claim in court
under Title VII, but the EEOC‘s analysis of the claim has no bearing on the employee‘s ability to
pursue the matter in court. After receiving a charge, the EEOC investigates the claim and
26

Linda Hamilton Krieger has made this comparison as well. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Watched Variable
Improves, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPKLACE 295, 317-20 (Faye J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S.
Ann Ropp eds., 2007).
27
I do not mean to suggest that enforcement in these areas is perfect. In fact recent events like the widespread
outbreak of E-Coli from tainted peanuts demonstrated the weaknesses in regulation of food safety. Betty Ann
Bowser, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Butter Raises Wider Health Concerns for FDA
(PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2009), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/janjune09/salmonella_01-23.html. Similarly, some have suggested that lack of regulation, or at least a lack of action by
regulators, was responsible for the crash of the mortgage market in late 2007 and early 2008. See Richard A. Posner,
Our Crisis of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at A23 (suggesting that regulators of the markets and banking
industries ―were asleep at the switch‖); Nelson D. Schwartz & Floyd Norris, Reluctant Eye over Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at A1 (reporting on responses to allegations of regulatory failure).
28
The EEOC is forbidden from releasing this data by law: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 8(e) (2006). The Office of
Contract Compliance Programs, the agency that enforces federal laws incorporated into federal contracts against
those contractors is similarly kept secret. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20 , 2.18(d) (2009).
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attempts to conciliate.29 The EEOC also currently has a policy of encouraging mediation.30 If
those processes fail, the EEOC decides whether the facts suggest that the employer
discriminated. If the EEOC believes the employer has discriminated, the EEOC will make a
finding to that effect and issue a letter to the employee giving the employee a right to sue the
employer in court.31 While everyone must start with the EEOC, the gate does not close once that
step has been satisfied. The EEOC will issue right to sue letters to employees where it has not yet
completed its investigation, and even where it has found that the facts do not suggest that the
employer discriminated.32 Only the passage of time will cut off an employee‘s ability to get
permission to sue an employer. An EEOC finding thus has no bearing on the ability of an
employee to bring a claim in court. Moreover, the action that a person brings is not an action to
review the EEOC‘s judgment about whether the employer discriminated, and so no deference is
owed the EEOC‘s finding of cause or no cause even if it has made one in the charge.33 Thus, the
EEOC is a gatekeeper only in the loosest sense of the word.
The EEOC is a weak agency in other respects, as well. It has the power to issue
regulations, but not substantive interpretive regulations, having the force of law.34 Following the
EEOC‘s regulations gives employers an affirmative defense to an action under Title VII,35 but
that is the extent of the EEOC‘s potential to influence employer behavior to prevent
discrimination. Employers are not bound to follow the regulations, and the courts rarely defer to
those regulations.36 And to make matters worse, on the prosecutorial side, the EEOC has never
been funded enough to bring claims in all or even a substantial minority of meritorious cases.37
Additionally, it doesn‘t appear that the EEOC is any more an expert at assessing discrimination
than the courts themselves. A recent study shows that the EEOC system to rate complaints
according to the likelihood that cause exists to believe the employer discriminated did not predict
case outcomes in federal court.38 This fact might show that the EEOC lacks the expertise to
29

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPURTUNITY COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 7 (2006); NATIONAL ACADAMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION: ORGANIZING FOR THE FUTURE 13-15 (2003).
31
The EEOC can instead decide to bring an action, in which an employee can intervene, but the EEOC does so in
only a tiny fraction of the charges filed with it.
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
33
See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937
(2006) (describing the lack of deference the Supreme Court has given to the EEOC‘s interpretation of Title VII).
34
The EEOC can issue substantive regulations under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90202, § 9, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 106, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
35
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (2006).
36
Hart, supra note 33.
37
U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECKUP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS
RECOMMENDATIONS, VOL. IV: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
40, 42 (2004), available at http://www.csccr.gov/pubs/10yr04/10yr04.pdf.
38
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States, RESEARCHING LAW 19-20, 28-30, 33 (American Bar Foundation,
Chicago, I.L.), Spring 2008, available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/rlspring08.pdf. Using a large random sampling of
employment discrimination cases filed between 1988 and 2003, the authors studied the resolution of those cases,
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analyze discrimination claims, that the federal courts lack that expertise, or that the norm
defining discrimination is unsettled. Regardless of the explanation, it demonstrates that the
EEOC has not been effective at enforcing that norm.
To remedy the enforcement gap and the secrecy problem, the public needs better access to
information, more control over development of the antidiscrimination norm, and a more effective
incentive system to promote compliance by employers. One way to accomplish these goals is to
consolidate the process of adjudication in a body with expertise in discrimination law and
expertise in the social sciences, particularly in human and organizational behavior and in
economics.
This model is attractive for several reasons. First, the law on employment discrimination
is a relatively specialized field, between the complicated proof structures and the complex
theoretical foundation, so that adjudications by experts will be more cost effective and lead to
more consistent application of the law. Second, enough individuals injured by discrimination
have difficulty getting relief through the system that expanding the availability of adjudications
will create greater access to justice. Third, the consistent application of the law and the better
dissemination of information will better signal to employers what practices constitute
discrimination, which will allow them to better avoid it.
What I propose is for Congress to create a new federal agency to, among other things,
adjudicate private sector discrimination claims.39 Employees would have to file charges with the
agency, just as they do now, and this agency would investigate those charges. The agency would
also be able to institute its own investigations. So far, this is similar to the EEOC functions, but
unlike the EEOC, the new agency would make public the allegations in the charges and the
employer‘s response to those charges.40 Additionally, it would hold hearings, make findings of
fact, and would conclude whether the law had been violated. If the law has been violated, the
agency would clarify what the employer could do to comply with Title VII and what remedy the
individual should be awarded. The agency‘s decision would be subject to ordinary administrative
review by a federal court, which would have to uphold factual findings if based on substantial
evidence and would have to accord most legal conclusions and recommendations substantial
deference.41 The new agency would also be empowered to issue regulations with the force of law,
accounting for the stage of litigation at which they were resolved in addition to the substantive outcome. Id. at 1, 911, 13-18.
39
The adjudicative body of the agency would be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and members should be balanced by political party. Members should also be balanced by background
experience, coming from both the employee and employer side. Finally, members should have some expertise in
workplace law, organizational psychology, business management, or some other relevant field.
40
This would be the default, but there would also have to be a process by which some types of information and some
proceedings could be kept sealed where privacy interests outweigh the public‘s need to know. Sexual harassment
cases, for example, are likely to involve highly private information and possibly humiliating details. A harassed
employee would have a strong interest in not having his or her identity or those details made public. On the employer
side, there may be instances in which proprietary information would be revealed. The employer would have a strong
interest in keeping that confidential.
41
Based on the expertise of the agency adjudicators, the courts might be encouraged to accord the legal
recommendations significant deference, similar to that often accorded the National Labor Relations Board.
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codifying its interpretation of what the anti-discrimination laws mean and how they should be
enforced.
Having a federal agency adjudicate discrimination claims has a number of advantages
over the current system. Agencies are created to harness the expertise of adjudicators – both legal
experts and non-law experts in the field, and having experts to decide discrimination cases can
bring greater coherence to this area of law. Administrative adjudications also conserve scarce
judicial resources by allowing non-article III judges to manage the fact-finding process in what
can be very fact-intensive inquiries. And using non-article III judges can be cost effective, since
the adjudicating labor market is more flexible, and likely less costly. Because of this cost savings,
more parties can have access to the adjudicatory process, creating greater access to that process
for those who cannot afford or find legal assistance. Moreover, to the extent that the federal
courts might be using summary judgment and motions to dismiss to rid their dockets of
meritorious cases because they dislike this area of law,42 having an agency handle this part of the
adjudication may remove such incentives.43
Creating a new agency to adjudicate discrimination claims also has significant
enforcement advantages. By making the information received by the agency public, this scheme
would solve much of the problem with the secrecy gap. The public would know more about the
allegations of discrimination and what is happening at work, which would lead to a better picture
of whether we are meeting the goal of eliminating workplace discrimination.44 Additionally, the
public would have a better idea of the content of the norm against employment discrimination.
Even if the parties agreed to keep the issues confidential, they would not be able to control the
agency.
Secrecy might still be achievable by employers; the parties could settle and make the
matter confidential by acting before the employee went to the agency. That type of secrecy seems
less problematic than the type we currently have. If this scheme simply moves the point of
optimal settlement to a point earlier in the process, employers will work harder to not allow
employment discrimination to occur or to remedy it as soon as it is brought to their attention,
before the employee goes to the new agency, creating a greater incentive for employers to
internalize the antidiscrimination norm, avoiding more injuries in the first place and
accomplishing the main goal of antidiscrimination law.
42

See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad
to Worse?, 3 HARV. LAW & POL‘Y REV. 103 (2009); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 1011; Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 283-84, 309 (1997); Michael
Selmi, Why Are Discrimination Cases so Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001); Suja A. Thomas, The New
Summary Judgment Motion: the Motion to Dismiss under Iqbal and Twombly, ___ LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. ___
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494683.
43
The fact that verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are more than four times as likely to
be reversed than verdicts in favor of defendants, Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 547, 556-58, 566 (2008), makes me a
little hesitant to even be this optimistic.
44
See Krieger, supra note 26, at 318-19.
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By giving the agency a much more direct role in enforcing Title VII, the proposal also
goes a long way towards closing the enforcement gap. There will still be people who don‘t know
their rights, but that number is likely to shrink the more information is made public about other
cases. There will also still be people who are deterred from pursuing their rights, but that too
should diminish to some extent the more settled the norm against discrimination becomes. And
with an expert cadre of adjudicators, the norm against employment discrimination is likely to
form in a more coherent manner, creating greater predictability for employers and employees
alike.
Despite these advantages, there are disadvantages and hurdles to having an agency
adjudicate discrimination claims. For example, if the EEOC has been chronically underfunded,
there seems little possibility that this new agency would be funded adequately to fulfill its
mandate. Similarly, if, as some report, employers are well served by the current system in the
sense that they face little liability for discrimination because of the trend in federal courts, they
will not support the creation of a new agency with independent enforcement powers.
Additionally, agencies being less independent from influence by market actors than Article III
judges and less politically accountable than elected officials, they may simply carry out the
agenda of a small minority of actors rather than dispense the justice needed.
Aside from these pragmatic concerns are legal concerns as well, the biggest of which in
my view is the focus of this paper: Article III‘s limitations on the judicial power of the United
States and life tenure and salary protection for judges.
III. ARTICLE III AND AGENCY DESIGN
The Constitution states,
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services,
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office.45
While this language might suggest that judicial power cannot be exercised by any tribunal
without life tenure and salary protections,46 Congress has created tribunals without those
protections since the earliest days of this country.47 The Supreme Court has validated the use of
these legislative courts almost as long as they have existed.48 And most scholars agree that we
could not now adopt any sort of literalist interpretation of this language.49
45

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 223.
47
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915,
919 (1988).
48
Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (holding constitutional the use of legislative courts).
49
See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts under Article III, 65
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One of the reasons that such an adoption would be impossible is that there is no bright
line between adjudication of legal disputes and enforcement of the law. An adjudication could be
described as the application of law to facts in a way that binds an individual with an interest at
stake. But most enforcement of the law or legislative enactment requires similar interpretation of
law and policy to facts in a way that binds individuals with an interest at stake.50 The difficulty of
distinguishing among the judicial, legislative, and executive powers ensures that no rigid rule can
be articulated to describe with precision what matters must, as a constitutional matter, be
determined by the judicial branch.
Congress has created and the Supreme Court has approved the use of legislative courts in
several areas. For the most part, their constitutionality depends on either a category of historical
use, or the nature or source of the interest at stake and the level of control by an Article III
court.51 As a historical matter, legislative courts have been permissible for U.S. possessions or
territories regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.52 Military courts, which try and punish
offenses by members of the armed forces while they are in active service, have also been
permissible.53 Additionally, military tribunals for those engaged in war against the United States
may sometimes be allowed.54
Aside from these special courts, traditionally, Congress could create legislative courts to
IND. L.J. 233, 239 (1990); Fallon, supra note 47, at 916-19.
50
E.g. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603,
618-19 (2001); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 561 (2007); V. F.
Nourse, Toward a new Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 859 (2004); David Orentlicher, Conflicts of
Interest and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 726 (2002).
51
Nelson, supra note 50, at 562-63 (distinguishing between public rights and private rights and noting the level of
Article III court involvement necessary for each). Some scholars have suggested that this approach which seeks to
determine the permissible jurisdiction of legislative courts by the category of right at stake is not fully accepted by
the Supreme Court and lacks coherent boundaries. E.g. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER‘S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 370 (5th Ed. 2003); Danile J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2571 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 204-05; Richard B. Saphire & Michael E.
Solomine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85,
111-20 (1988). Professor Nelson demonstrates the underlying logic in historical terms and explains its continuing
vitality in the Court‘s jurisprudence, however. Nelson, supra note 50.
52
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 224-29. Nelson suggests that the reason for this is that the territorial courts do not
exercise the power of the ―whole‖ United States, but only the power of their territory. Nelson, supra note 50, at 57576.
53
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 230-33.
54
Id. at 233-36; see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that a military commission could try
German nationals for war crimes in Germany without any Article III oversight); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(allowing a military tribunal to try German saboteurs in the U.S. for violations of the law of war). Most recently,
Congress created a military commission to try those held outside of the U.S. for terrorism or aiding terrorism.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, title X, 119 Stat. 2739; Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).The Supreme Court has held most recently that military detainees
must have access to article III courts to challenge their detention, or the military tribunal must provide most of the
key due process protections that are available in federal courts. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266-74
(2008) (holding that the procedures provided by the Detainee Treatment Act are not a sufficient substitute for habeas
corpus relief in an Article III court and that the Article III review was insufficient).
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adjudicate what are considered to be public rights.55 Public rights are those created by the federal
government or held by the federal government in trust for the benefit of all of us.56 Expenditures
of money from the public treasury, or entitlements, are classic examples.57 Thus, public rights
disputes usually involve non-criminal disputes between the government and private parties in
which core private rights of life, liberty, and property are not at stake.58
The logic behind this principle was that where Congress has the discretion to create the
substantive right, it had the ability to shape that right, to allow it to be abrogated by
Congressional action without direct judicial oversight.59 Similarly, where Congress has created a
right, it has the discretion to allow (or not allow) parties to sue the government over that right,
and having allowed that, may dictate what shape that litigation must take.60
Contrasted with these public rights disputes are private right disputes. Private rights
include core rights to life, liberty, and property, but more broadly, those rights held by
individuals, and not by the public at large.61 Your average tort case is a private right dispute,
involving two private parties, concerning a right established by common law or state statute, and
seeking liability and damages for past acts.62 Disputes over private rights ―lie at the core of the
historically recognized judicial power.‖63 Thus, these disputes require significant oversight by an
Article III court.64 Still, even where private rights are at stake, non-article III actors can exercise
significant adjudicatory power.

55

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 51, 69-70 n.24 (1982) (plurality opinion).
Nelson, supra note 50, at 566-70.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 569-72; see N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69-70 n.24.
59
Nelson, supra note 50, at 570-72, 581; see also N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
60
Nelson, supra note 50, at 582-84; see also N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (plurality opinion). Even when a plaintiff
had a core private right at stake – where person sued to redress an injury to liberty or property – the matter could be
handled without judicial involvement because the government itself had not actually injured the person, but was
simply indemnifying the government official who had. Id. at 584. This rationale is in line with sovereign immunity
jurisprudence more generally. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that a state official could be sued
for prospective injunctive relief for violations of the law because the state itself could not violate the law); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying a private right of action to sue federal officials for
injuries caused in violation of federal law or the constitution); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that
government officers could be sued for damages for injuring a person in violation of federal law or constitution).
61
Nelson, supra note 50, at 567.
62
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (plurality opinion).
63
Id. (plurality opinion)
64
Id. at 79, 77-84 (plurality opinion). The extent of that oversight has been the subject of much scholarly debate.
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 47 (proposing that appellate review by Article III courts be sufficient on something of a
sliding scale depending upon the interests at stake); Nelson, supra note 50, at 609-13 (summarizing the current state
of the law classifying whether Article III oversight is necessary and to what extent based on the type of right at
issue); Redish, supra note 51, at 208-09, 226-27 (arguing that matters listed in Article III section 2 must get fairly
searching review in an Article III court); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 689-97 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court must have some
sort of oversight over agency adjudication); Saphire & Solimine, supra note 51, at 139-44 (arguing that ordinary
administrative review with de novo review of the law and something like substantial evidence review of the facts
must be available in an Article III court for any agency adjudication).
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In addition to the type of interest at stake, the legitimacy of political branch adjudication
depends on the manner and extent to which the nonjudicial actor can bind individuals. This
depends on two things: 1. whether the agency action is forward or backward looking; and 2.
whether the nonjudicial actor‘s decision is self-executing.
Congress has significantly broader power to create obligations reaching into the future,
and very little power to attach new consequences to past acts.65 It is primarily the judiciary that
has the latter power. Thus, litigation about the amount of social security benefits a person might
be entitled to in the future can take place entirely in a legislative court, but challenges to the
constitutionality of an action taken by the Social Security Administration, might need more
oversight by an Article III court.
Whether the nonjudicial actor‘s decision is self-executing is really more of a mechanism
for ensuring a goodly amount of Article III court supervision. If the prevailing party needs to take
the agency‘s decision to a federal court in order to have the decision enforced, that court will be
able to review the grounds of the decision, the processes followed to reach it, and the evidence
before the decisionmaker. This process may allow more reaching review by the federal judiciary
than ordinary administrative or appellate review, in which the courts are often required to be very
deferential to fact-finding, interpretation of the law, and application of the law to the facts.
Additionally, if Article III courts have supervisory authority over the nonjudicial actor, they will
have even more control over the content of the decision.
While these lines on the nature of the right at stake, and the manner in which relief is
provided are helpful, the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue have not focused on
them as explicitly as it had previously. A bit of history here might be helpful.
A. The Supreme Court’s Article I Adjudication Decisions
The Court has several times considered cases in which non-article III actors have been
given the power to adjudicate, or to participate in the adjudication, of what have traditionally
been considered private right claims – claims of life, liberty, or ―old‖ property, which include
property rights long recognized in tangible and intangible things, as opposed to ―new‖ property,
which refers to governmental entitlements, services, and licenses.66 And while these cases do
allocate particular matters and types of decisions to Article I decisionmakers or Article III
decisionmakers by considering the factors laid out above, a more detailed analysis of the cases
65

See Nelson, supra note 50, at 562, 595-98; see also Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and
Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015 (2006).
66
The label and analysis of this new kind of property comes from Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964). Both Professor Fallon and Professor Nelson have recognized that old and new property have been
treated differently by the Court in this area, adjudication of rights related to new property receiving less Article III
involvement. Nelson, supra note 50, at 606-13, 623-27; see Fallon, supra note 47, at 952, 966-67 (using the
language of right to talk about things generally considered old property, and using the term ―privilege‖ to talk about
at least some new property; arguing however that the distinction between rights and privileges has been eroded and
many privileges should get greater Article III court protection); see also Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property:
The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 11-13 (1980).
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reveals the nuances of those factors and how they interact.
1. Crowell v. Benson, Setting the Stage
In the first of these cases to go beyond the traditional categories, Crowell v. Benson,67 the
Court was asked to consider whether an administrative agency could be given the power to
decide workers‘ compensation disputes for workers injured in maritime accidents. Such workers
were not covered by state workers‘ compensation laws because maritime accidents were covered
by maritime law, and thus, exclusively federal.68 The agency actor, the deputy commissioner of
the United States Employees‘ Compensation Commission, was empowered to hold hearings and
decide whether compensation was owed under the terms of the statute and if so, in what
amount.69 The deputy commissioner‘s order was self-executing, in the sense that it was final; it
could be set aside on application to a federal district court within thirty days, but payment would
proceed if ordered unless the federal court stayed the payment on the ground that the employer
would suffer irreparable damage.70 The order was not wholly self-executing, in the sense that the
commissioner lacked the power to enjoin an employer who refused to comply. If the employer
refused to comply, the beneficiary of an award had to apply for enforcement to a federal district
court, which would decide whether the order ―was made and served in accordance with law‖ and
which would issue a mandatory injunction if it was.71
The Court determined that this matter, ―liability of one individual to another under the
law as defined‖ was a matter of private right.72 But that fact alone did not mean that all matters
related to the decisionmaking process be handled by an Article III judge.
[I]n cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in
constitutional courts shall be made by judges. . . . In cases of equity and admiralty,
it is historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of
the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes
of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account or to find the amount of
damages. While the reports of masters and commissioners in such cases are
essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice to disturb their
findings when they are properly based upon evidence, in the absence of errors of
law, and the parties have no right to demand that the court shall redetermine the
facts thus found.73
Moreover, the scope of the agency‘s jurisdiction was quite narrow, ―confined to the relation of
master and servant, and the method of determining the questions of fact, which arise in the
67
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routine of making compensation awards to employees under the act, is necessary to its effective
enforcement. The act itself . . . establishes the measure of the employers liability.‖74 Thus, for at
least some kinds of cases, non-judicial decisionmakers can be used by the Article III court to
manage litigation and do a preliminary finding of facts, which judges need review only to gauge
whether they are ―based on evidence‖ and made in the absence of errors of law. In other words,
administrative adjudicators can decide what really happened in the underlying dispute. But the
effects of that decision go one step further. At least for fact-intensive questions, administrative
adjudicators get to decide, or at least get the first stab at, what the end result of the dispute should
be upon application of the law they are charged with enforcing to these facts.
The Court did place some limitations on the kinds of decisions that would receive this
much deference. Questions related to the validity of the statute being enforced, its
constitutionality, for example, or whether the statute applied to the situation at issue, had to be
determined by the Article III court de novo.75 The mechanism of review for these types of
decisions, a suit in equity, ensured that parties could plead and prove with evidence before the
district court that the statute was invalid or did not apply.76
The Court applied the reasoning in Crowell to validate the use of magistrates, non-Article
III judges, in dispositive matters in criminal cases, also private rights matters because they
involve rights to life and liberty, in United States v. Raddatz.77 The mechanism of review of
magistrate decisions is even more direct: a magistrate issues a report and recommendation on the
matter to be decided, and the district court decides how much weight to give, if any, to any part
objected to by a party.78 The district court judge can receive further evidence or send the matter
back to the magistrate with instructions.79 Moreover, the control of the case as a whole is more
direct—the case is filed with the district court, and the district court judge decides whether to
refer particular matters to a magistrate, or the parties can consent to having a magistrate conduct
the proceedings and enter final orders.80 Additionally, the control of the magistrates themselves is
within the judicial branch: Article III judges appoint magistrates for fixed terms and set their
salaries.81
2. Northern Pipeline: Stumbling towards a Test
The Court invalidated adjudication by non-article-III decisionmakers in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,82 which struck down the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
That Act created a system of bankruptcy judges to adjudicate all civil proceedings arising under
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the bankruptcy or ―arising in or related to cases under title 11.‖83 That broad grant meant that the
bankruptcy judge could hear a wide variety of claims:
suits to recover accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to
avoid transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and
causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law as well as those based
on federal law. . . . The judges of the bankruptcy courts are vested with all of the
―powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,‖ except that they ―may not
enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence
of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.‖ . . . In
addition to this broad grant of power, Congress has allowed bankruptcy judges the
power to hold jury trials, . . . to issue declaratory judgments, . . . to issue writs of
habeas corpus under certain circumstances, . . . to issue all writs necessary in aid
of the bankruptcy court's expanded jurisdiction, . . . and to issue any order, process
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate . . . .84
The decision yielded no majority opinion, but a majority of the judges held that allowing
non-Article III decisionmakers such broad jurisdiction over inherently judicial matters,
particularly state law matters, and such broad powers to act without supervision, in the
sense of prior approval or searching review, by Article III courts violated Article III and
the principle of separation of powers.85 The plurality‘s opinion focused on the traditional
categories in which legislative courts had been recognized, stated that those categories
should not be expanded, and would have found that this delegation was unconstitutional
because it did not fit any of the traditional categories.86 The concurrence did not agree
that the categorical approach urged by the plurality was a wholly accurate summary of
prior cases, but did agree that more Article III oversight was necessary.87
3. Thomas v. Union Carbide and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor : Converging on an Approach
The two most recent cases the Supreme Court has decided were very similar to
each other and related to areas heavily regulated by federal law: the licensing and labeling
of pesticides and the regulation of the commodities markets. The statute at issue in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, allowed companies seeking to register a
pesticide to piggy-back on a prior company‘s research to demonstrate the health, safety,
and environmental effects of the product.88 The follow-on company had to pay
compensation to the initial company, and the statute created a system of binding
arbitration, with very limited review in the federal courts, to determine the appropriate
83
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level of compensation.89 Several companies that had done initial research and who felt the
compensation awarded was too low, challenged the system, arguing that decisions about
their rights to property had to be made with much more involvement by Article III
courts.90
The Supreme Court disagreed, however. The Court rejected the argument that any
dispute between private parties was automatically a ―private rights‖ dispute or that the
right to compensation was a state common law right.91 While there may be some private
right characteristics in the statutory right to compensation – the initial company might be
said to have some type of property right in its research – the statutory right also had
public right characteristics – use of the data serves the public purpose of safeguarding
public health.92 Additionally, there had never actually been a recognized property in this
type of information. While there is a property right in research that falls under trade
secrets doctrine, that right exists only while the information is kept secret.93 Because the
research had to be disclosed to the agency for the pesticides to be sold to the public, the
research was no longer secret, and no common law or state statute recognized a property
interest in that information any more.94 Moreover, underlying this reasoning was broader
context, the system regulating the sale of these dangerous chemicals—there was no
freestanding unfettered property right to sell products potentially dangerous to the public
health and the environment. In other words, there was an ex ante barrier to the sale in the
first place.95
Resolving the issue, the Court held that ―Congress . . . may create a seemingly
‗private‘ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary.‖96 The import of the Court‘s ruling might also be to suggest that if there would
be no right but for Congress‘ creation, the right/privilege distinction highlighted by
Professors Fallon and Nelson,97 then there is no right sufficiently private, or no matter
inherently judicial enough, to require extensive Article III involvement.
The most recent case on the subject, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) v. Schor,98 the statue at issue also related to a field highly regulated by Congress,
with ex ante barriers to entry, but the issue that could be decided by the non-Article III
89
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decisionmaker was not quite as narrow. The CFTC had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
brought by customers against brokers for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act or
the CFTC‘s regulations.99 There was also a permissive counterclaim regulation: the
CFTC could adjudicate counterclaims, including state law counterclaims, arising out of
the transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.100 The jurisdiction over
counterclaims was not exclusive; the counterclaim did not have to be raised in this
proceeding, but could be raised in other fora.101 And the final agency decision was subject
to review in federal district court, but the review was ordinary administrative review, not
very searching.102
A customer brought an action within the CFTC against his broker, alleging that a
debit balance in his account was caused by the broker‘s violations of the Act.103 The
broker brought a diversity action in federal district court seeking to recover that debit
balance, and the customer counterclaimed that the debit was caused by the violations of
the Act.104 The customer twice moved in the federal court to stay or dismiss the action as
duplicative of the CFTC proceedings, and so the broker voluntarily dismissed the district
court action, and brought the action to recover the balance as a counterclaim to the
customer‘s agency action.105 When the customer lost, he challenged the agency‘s
decision, and the Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the question of whether the CFTC‘s
jurisdiction over the counterclaim, which arose under state law, was constitutional.106
Unlike in Thomas, the right at stake for the customer was a traditional common
law right, and the Supreme Court recognized that the ―private rights‖ nature of the
counterclaim was significant to the analysis.107 However, the Court held that the private
rights nature of the claim was not determinative.108 Article III is not solely concerned with
protecting the private rights of individuals109 in the Court‘s view; rather Article III seeks
to protect the interests of the judicial branch itself, reserving the judicial branch‘s
appropriate structural role as a check on the executive and legislative branches, and only
to a lesser extent does Article III protect individual rights, primarily through those same
checks.110
With this structural interest as the touchstone, the Court established a combination
balancing and threshold test to take account of those two interests. The balancing part
requires a court to look to the scope of the agency‘s jurisdiction. When agency
99
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adjudication was subject to ordinary review, it will be constitutional as long as the subject
matter jurisdiction of the agency does not encroach too far into the regular work of the
judicial branch.111 And the threshold test focused on the individual right to an
independent judiciary. As long as the parties consented to adjudication before the agency,
then this right would not be injured.112
Applying the new test to the case before it, the Court upheld the CFTC‘s decision.
Because the CFTC‘s jurisdiction over state law counterclaims was very narrow – those
claims had to arise in connection with commodities brokerage accounts, an area of law
that was highly regulated by Congress – the power to adjudicate the claims did not
encroach very far into the regular work of the judicial branch.113 And because the parties
consented to having the agency adjudicate the claim, they had waived any individual
interest they may have had in having an Article III court adjudicate.114
B. Synthesizing the Whole Mess
Thus, there are a number of lines that need to be drawn to map out the appropriate
role for an administrative agency in any kind of enforcement scheme, any one of which
could be the starting point for analysis. First, assuming no concurrent jurisdiction, which
is likely relatively rare, what is the mechanism and scope of Article III courts‘ control
over the agency process? Nonjudicial determinations that require some kind of positive
action in the federal court or direct appeal as of right with de novo review will tend to
provide the most oversight of the process for decision. At the same time, they provide a
mechanism for waiver of that review, essentially consent to the non-Article III
adjudication, by anyone not seeking enforcement or direct appeal. Giving Article III
judges supervisory control in a human resources sense will provide for even more direct
oversight, and will allow for corrections where infringement goes beyond the individual
interests in Article III adjudication and into the structural interests of the federal courts, in
Schor‘s terms. Appointments by the executive branch and ordinary administrative review
on the other hand will provide for the least amount of oversight, and will make sense
when there is no structural interest at stake.
If there is little Article III oversight, only ordinary administrative review, for example, the
other question to be asked is, are the rights potentially at stake public rights or private rights?
Only in private rights cases need there be Article III oversight, and even in private rights cases,
nonjudicial actors can decide some matters with little oversight. The amount of oversight seems
to depend on the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction and the type of private rights potentially
at stake. In all of the cases, the scope of the nonjudicial actor‘s subject matter jurisdiction was
relevant. The more narrow the jurisdiction, the more likely review could be deferential and the
less direct need be the supervision of the nonjudicial actor‘s day-to-day work by the Article III
111
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court. That is the structural interest the Court refers to in Schor. And, the type of private right at
stake matters here also. Decisions about life, liberty, and property recognized at common law
need significant oversight either because they are core private rights or because as core private
rights they are inherently judicial matters, and taking them from the courts will work a substantial
institutional injury.
Another way to look at the public or private rights distinction is whether the contemplated
agency action is forward looking or backward looking. A determination of liability, looking
backward on past acts, is more likely to impact a private right and requires significant Article III
involvement. A cease and desist order, limiting permissible conduct in the future is essentially
just like Congress declaring a particular practice to be impermissible now and into the future, and
thus, requires much less Article III oversight. It also, in most cases, won‘t involve any sort of
private right unless the cease and desist order is so broad as to be confiscatory.
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This flowchart illustrates how the analysis plays out.
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 Direct appeal
 de novo review

No – Low Article III
oversight (ordinary
administrative review or
less)?

Private Right at
stake (life, liberty,
vested property)? or
Backward-looking
relief?

Yes
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY ADJUDICATION AS A REGULATORY TOOL
So given the analysis the Court has used, the necessary question to ask at this point is
whether an agency could adjudicate claims in the area to be regulated. To illustrate this analysis, I
will go back to the example of employment discrimination. To analyze whether claims of
employment discrimination could be adjudicated by the agency I have proposed, we must
determine whether discrimination is a private rights issue, and if so, how much Article III
oversight would be necessary. If there are no private rights, no inherently judicial matters at
stake, then there is no obstacle to an agency adjudicating discrimination claims with very little
Article III oversight.
The answer to this question is complicated. It requires us to analyze the nature of the right
at stake as one important data point, which is not an easy task. I will start by analyzing the nature
of the employer‘s interest, differentiating among different types of employers, and then turn to an
analysis of the employee‘s interest in each context.
Government employers would have no private rights in the sense usually discussed, and
so analyzing their interests would seem relatively straightforward. This is particularly true for the
federal government, suits against which would fit into the traditional public rights model. States
would likely also not be considered to have private rights in any traditional sense, but states have
an interest that is analogous in their immunity from suit brought by individuals in federal courts,
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a right embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that states cannot be
made amenable to suit brought by a private party before a federal agency without their consent.115
And so regardless of whether a state‘s interest as an employer would be characterized as a private
right, unconsenting states cannot be required to submit to the agency adjudication.
For private employers, we must analyze the nature of the right. Title VII, when it was
enacted, was revolutionary in many ways. It was a conscious attempt by Congress to change
society through legislation.116 Congress prohibited the practice of discrimination by employers,
an encroachment into what had traditionally been sacrosanct: managerial prerogative. In an
employment relationship, the law has traditionally protected private employers, often on the
rationale that they have property and liberty rights in the use of their capital. They have a right
not to have that capital taken away either without due process or compensation, and that property
right includes a right to use their capital in any way that does not infringe on another person‘s
rights or strongly interfere with the public interest, something that also sounds in liberty. The
employment relationship is a use of capital, and the employer decides who should receive
payment, for what types of services, and under what conditions. At the same time, those rights
are not absolute or unbounded. Congress has ongoing power to declare particular uses of property
impermissible as infringements on the rights of others or as contravening the public interest. So
to the extent that an employer would be ordered not to engage in particular practices even as to a
particular individual from now on, there is no right that has been infringed in a due process sense.
115
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Declaring that a past action injured a person or violated public policy, and assessing a criminal
penalty or damages seems more clearly to infringe on liberty or property, though.
On the employee side, the issues are a little more ambiguous. Employees are generally not
seen to have property rights in future employment except in very limited circumstances. Thus,
where the action that was discriminatory was refusing to hire, refusing to promote, demotion, or
termination, the employee‘s property rights will likely be considered not to be affected. And there
has never been a liberty interest found in future work for a particular employer. At the same time,
discrimination is itself an injury to dignity at the least, probably some form of property or liberty
interest, which suggests that employees in at least some circumstances may also be able to claim
a private rights interest. This may be an especially strong claim in the context of government
employers. First, sometimes government employees, more often than private employees, have
property rights in their continued employment, created by contract or statute. And second, even
where they do not have property rights, public employees have liberty rights in not being subject
to injury for reasons that would violate the Constitution, like because of the employee‘s race or
sex or in retaliation for engaging in First Amendment activity. Thus, to the extent that a
discrimination claim might implicate these things, a private right of the public employee would
likely be at stake.
However, there is likely no private rights bar under the current state of the law on the
private employee side; absent our anti-discrimination laws, there is no remedy for discrimination
against private employers. In other words, there is no enforceable right to be free from
discrimination by private parties on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, age, or
disability founded in either the common law or the Constitution.
Overall then, Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes do not fall
perfectly into the public rights/private rights categories. They involve both. Given that for at least
some types of remedies, and some types of parties, a private right might be at stake in
adjudication of discrimination, we turn next to the remedies currently available under Title VII.
When it was enacting Title VII, Congress could have made a number of different choices.
It could have criminalized employment discrimination, but it chose not to do that.117 It could
have conditioned some sort of license to do business on compliance with rules designed to
prevent employment discrimination, and an agency could have regulated the licensing process. It
could have given primary regulatory power to an agency, allowing no private right of action at
all. It did not need to create an agency, but instead could simply have given employees private
rights of action along with damages and other remedies, leaving to those private parties all
enforcement.
The choice that Congress did make mixed many of these elements. Congress created an
117
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agency to enforce the statute, the EEOC, but gave it very limited powers. Originally, the EEOC
was empowered only to provide technical assistance, to investigate, and to attempt conciliation; it
could not prosecute charges of discrimination and could not adopt substantive interpretive
regulations.118 In 1972, the EEOC was given the power to prosecute actions in federal court, in
order to provide for more effective enforcement.119 Additionally, coverage was extended to state
and local governments.120
And the remedies were somewhat limited as well. The statute originally allowed courts to
order injunctive relief including instatement or reinstatement, back pay, and ―such [other]
affirmative action as may be appropriate.‖121 By creating a private right of action against
employers, Congress created the potential for private rights disputes, which would suggest that
Article III courts would have to have substantial oversight. However, by limiting remedies to
back pay, reinstatement, and other forms of equitable remedies, Congress limited the potential
agency action to only relief that would not infringe on any vested rights to property or liberty,
which made it possible that an agency could act without Article III supervision. Additionally, by
allowing the Attorney General, and later the EEOC, to pursue civil cases of ―pattern and
practice‖ discrimination on behalf of the government, for which equitable relief could be
awarded,122 Congress established a system of public rights as between employers and the
government. And so, from the start, Congress could have designed the EEOC to adjudicate
claims of discrimination, at least those brought by the government as prosecutor, as long as there
was some way to review the decision in an Article III court.
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow for damages to be awarded.123 When it did
that, it may have foreclosed the possibility that it could have an agency adjudicate any
discrimination claims seeking damages on behalf of an employee.
Analysis of the nature of right at stake is not determinative, though, of the level of Article
III oversight necessary. We still must look to the level of infringement on the ordinary work of
the federal courts by looking at the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the proposed
agency. On the one hand, the jurisdiction might seem to be fairly narrow—simply violations of
federal antidiscrimination laws. However, the subject of discrimination is not nearly as narrow,
nor the workplace nearly as regulated, as was the situation in either Thomas or Schor. In both
118
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situations, there was no background right to engage in the conduct the regulated parties had
engaged in. Congress had created barriers to entry into the field at all. The workplace is not like
that. Anyone can become an employer simply by paying another for a service. And there are
relatively few limits on that transaction.
Thus, there seems more of an encroachment on the regular work of the judicial branch
than in the cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld the use of non-judicial actors with little
Article III oversight. At the same time, though, barring giving the new agency jurisdiction over
state common law claims that might be related to the adverse employment action, like intentional
infliction of emotional distress, discharge in violation of public policy, or breach of contract, the
subject matter jurisdiction is substantially more narrow than that of the Bankruptcy Courts
invalidated by the Court in Northern Pipeline. Likely, the jurisdiction would be considered
narrow enough not to infringe too far on the structural interests of the federal courts, but not so
narrow as to be mandatory – likely the individual interest in access to an article III court would
be infringed upon enough that consent by all employers subject to actions for damages and
government employees in all cases would be necessary.
And so what does this mean for design for the agency? Making the process optional
would be one way to comply with Article III. It is likely that making the process optional will
mean that it is never used, however. Employers have little incentive to agree to have a claim
considered by an agency, when the courts so frequently rule in their favor. Agency proceedings
will be less expensive, but that does not by itself appear to be enough incentive. The EEOC for
some time has been promoting its mediation program. It has had great difficulty getting
employers to participate, however, because they see little validity in the employee‘s complaint
and believe that they have little to lose by refusing.124 If they refuse, the chances that the
employee will sue are very small, and so even the prospect of legal fees is not enough to justify
the expense of the agency proceedings. Additionally, even if an employee does sue, the chances
of the employee surviving a motion to dismiss or summary judgment are very small, and of
surviving appeal if they win, also small.125
At this point, a reader might be wondering why the answer is not simply to provide for
extensive judicial review. Ways to do that might be to make it more like the process of the
National Labor Relations Board, in that the agency‘s order in favor of an employee would not be
self-executing. Employees would have to seek payment of damages or issuance of an injunction
in federal court based on the agency‘s factual findings and recommendations. For findings in
which private employers were found not to have discriminated, there might need to be little
Article III oversight. An alternative to the enforcement proceeding, perhaps, employees could
seek judicial review of the agency‘s decision in federal court, and employers could seek review
rather than comply if they were found to have discriminated. That review might be very
searching, considering the matter de novo. If the review route were taken, if the employer failed
to comply with the recommendations without seeking review, either the agency or the employee
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would be able to go to court to seek sanctions for that failure to comply.
That extensive judicial review would seem to eviscerate most of the reasons to create an
agency adjudicator in the first place. The proceedings will be more efficient and less costly (at
least for the courts) if article III judges are not overseeing the process of managing discovery,
taking evidence, and mediating pre-trial motions. However the courts will still have many cases
to decide if review is practically automatic. Additionally, to the extent that the process seeks to
harness the expertise of the decisionmaker or more clearly set norms, if the courts have free
reign, and don‘t agree with the agency‘s views of the norm (much like the current climate with
the EEOC), then the agency won‘t be able to serve that function.
Another solution that would not suffer from either weakness, might be to change the
system entirely to be more like workers‘ compensation insurance. Discrimination has been
likened to a dangerous condition on land,126 and so perhaps that analogy is useful. If
discrimination is likely, perhaps employers should have to pay into a sort of discrimination
insurance fund. The amounts due the fund would be determined by an agency based on findings
of discrimination – the more discrimination claims per employee, the higher the contribution
required per employee. Employees who believed they had been discriminated against could apply
to the fund, and the agency would determine whether they had, and how much they were due as a
result, paying from the fund. Perhaps for particularly egregious instances, the employer would
also be subject to civil fines, which would go into the fund. This system, at least in the private
sector would appear to avoid the private right problem entirely. The problem with this system is
that the structural changes that injunctive relief could provide would have to be provided for in
some separate process.
Similarly, perhaps the agency‘s order regarding liability and awarding equitable relief
would be self-executing, but any damages portion would have to be brought to a federal court for
enforcement. That too would likely not involve any private right being finally adjudicated by the
agency and would also limit the scope of review the federal courts could exercise over much of
the decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Article III is not the only potential constitutional barrier to agency adjudication. Other
constitutional provisions would have to be considered as well. Due process is likely not a
problem as long as the agency process provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard and
minimizes the risk of erroneous deprivation.127 In theory, there might at some point be a
substantive due process or equal protection problem with carving out particular claims or claims
of suspect classes for special treatment. Additionally, if the agency awards damages, the Seventh
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Amendment will likely be implicated.128 But for the most part, these issues will likely be
approached as a matter of balancing with a threshold consent requirement analogous to the
balancing that the article III analysis requires us to engage in.
For most of the types of regulatory reform that are on our national agenda for which
adjudication will seem a possible regulatory solution, it is likely that some form of private right
will be at stake. While there will likely be no absolute bar, then, to the use of adjudication, the
key will be to create enough incentive for parties to consent to the system‘s use, or to rethink the
regulatory system more broadly to restructure what might be considered private rights into a
more clearly public rights framework. This paper begins to outline ways that might be done.
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